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RECENT PROPOSALS TO CHANGE THE
TRADITIONAL MILITARY RETIREMENT
SYSTEM TO MIRROR THE FEDERAL
SERVICE RETIREMENT: ERODING
DISCIPLINE AND CIVILmMILITARY
RELATIONS THROUGH POTENTIALLY
UNLAWFUL AND CERTAINLY
QUESTIONABLE ACTS
JosHUA E. KAsTENBERG, LT. CoL., USAFt

In a time of budget tightening and sequestration debates, it
should be unsurprising that there are proposals to significantly overhaul the military retirement system in the name of "reform." The last
four years has seen increasingly contentious debates in the U.S. Congress on the size and scope of federal expenditures, including the U.S.
Department of Defense's personnel costs. On August 2, 2011, the
President of the United States signed into law the Budget Control Act
of 2011. 1 That law creates uncertainty to the future Department of
Defense budgets, including military pay and benefits, as well as the
military pension system. It enables the President to preserve military
personnel programs, but at the expense of other defense programs. 2
Military veterans have received pension allotments from the government since the nation's founding. 3 Since the mid-1960s there have
been efforts to alter the military retirement system, with varying degrees of congressional and public support, or public apathy. 4 None of
the proposals take into consideration the effect of changing the current pension system on military discipline, a critical component of national security. This Article explores the potential immediate and
t Lt. Col. Kastenberg is a military judge with 17 years of military duty. He has
served in a variety of national security and international law positions. The views in
this article are the author's only and not the position of the Department of Defense or
any other government agency.
1. Pub. L. No. 112-25, 125 Stat. 240.
2. 2 U.S.C. § 901(a)(3) (2012).
3. See, e.g., Act of Mar. 3, 1865, ch. 84, 13 Stat. 499 (Civil War); Act of May 13,
1846, ch. 16, 9 Stat. 9 (Mexican War); Act of Apr. 24, 1816, ch. 68, 3 Stat. 296 (War of
1812); Act of Mar. 23, 1792, ch. 11, 1 Stat. 243 (Revolutionary War); Act of Sept. 29,
1789, ch. 24, 1 Stat. 95 (Revolutionary War).
4. See CHARLES A. HENNING, CoNG. RESEARCH SEHV., R42087, MILITARY RETIHEMENT REFORM: A REVIEW OF PIWPOSALS AND OPTIONS ~'OR CONGRESS 2 (2011), available
at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42087.pdf.

370

CREIGHTON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46

secondary effects of retirement reform on military discipline, in a
manner which has not, to the author's knowledge, been accomplished
before. Although historic examples are interspersed throughout this
Article, it is helpful to provide context to the most recent and radical of
the proposed alterations to the current retirement system.
On January 15, 1969, Secretary of Defense Clark Clifford reported to Congress that the traditional military retirement system
had become cumbersome on the economy. Clifford posited that most
military retirees were not "true retirees" because of their relative
youth in comparison to the nation's workforce. He proposed a two
tiered retirement system where a retired veteran would collect "a supplement to the retiree's second career earnings, and later an income
adequate for full retirement at the normal age for retiring from the
work force." 5 He did not call for an abandonment of the government's
obligation to ensure a defined pension. Instead, he concluded, "[T]o
this end, the retirement system should pay the individual one amount
between retirement from military service and the normal retirement
age, and a higher amount when he reaches that age." 6 Clifford's plan
gained no adherents in the Congress, and indeed, Clifford's successor,
Melvin Laird, found the proposal an immoral action to impose on a
generation of service-members who had served in the Korean and
Southeast Asian con:flicts. 7 For reasons discussed below, the most recent proposals could easily be categorized in Laird's response as well.
Since Laird's tenure, individual members of Congress have, in differing degrees ranging from deferred retirement to the establishment
of 401(k) programs, called for changes, but in all cases without considering how their proposals would affect the military discipline aspect of
national security. In 2006, 2008, and 2010, the Congressional Research Service ("CRS") also noted that advocates of reform to the
traditional twenty year military retirement describe the retirement
program as "unsustainable."8 Ultimately, these proposals have
gained little traction; perhaps, as a realization of what former Secre-

5. CLARK M. CLIFFORD, THE 1970 DEFENSE BuDGET AND DEFENSE PRoGRAM FOR
FISCAL YEARS 1970-1974: A STATEMENT BY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE CLARK M. CLIFFORD
(1969).
6. Id.
7. See MELVIN LAIRD, THE PROBLEM OF' MILITARY READINESS 13-29 (1980).
8. CHARLES A. HENNING, CoNG. RESEARCH SERV., RL34751, MILITARY RETIREMENT: BACKGROUND AND RECENT DEVELOPMENTS (2010), available at http://ww;v.fas.org/
sgp/crs/misc/RL34'75l.pdf; CHARLES A. HENNING, CoNG. RESEARCH SERV., IB85159, MILITARY RETIREMENT: MAJOR LEGISLATIVE IssUES (2006), available at http://www.fas.org/
sgp/crs/natsec/IB85159.pdf; see HENNING, supra note 4, at 19.
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tary of Defense Caspar vVeinberger urged existed as a connection between benefits and veterans treatment and military readiness. 9
Part I of this Article presents the most recent proposal, articulated in 2011 by the Defense Business Board ("DBB"), and analyzes its
inherent shortcomings. 10 Part II provides an interlocking broad view
analysis as to why the conversion of retirements in a 401(k) model
could prove disastrous to discipline. 11 This is an important issue because there will invariably exist a nexus between the questionable legality of such a conversion, and the trust of long-serving servicemembers in the military establishment. This interlocking analysis
addresses: (1) the potential for erosion of the civil-military relationship, (2) the relationship between the Takings Clause 12 of the Fifth
Amendment and military retirements, (3) the principle of detrimental
reliance, and (4) the inapplicability of case law to support the radical
alteration scheme for military retirements posed by the DBB. The
analysis also addresses the legal impediment of unlawful orders to the
proposed scheme. Part III of this Article analyzes two potential direct
impacts that would likely undermine discipline through weakening
the Uniform Code of Military Justice ("UCMJ"). 13 It must be
remembered that military retirements are not true retirements. The
receipt of military retirements is the instrument in which the government may recall its veterans to active service in time of national emergency, or for the individualized purpose of bringing a criminal to
justice.
I.

THE DEFENSE BUSINESS BOARD PROPOSAL OF 2011

In 2011, a Department of Defense study group, the Defense Business Board ("DBB"), called for a conversion of the military retirement
system into a 401(k) type retirement mirroring the federal
workforce. 14 The premise ofthe DBB proposal was based on a claim of
unsustainability in the costs of military retirements without referencing whether Congress might seek to increase tax revenues or reallo9. CASPAR WEINBERGER, FIGHTING FOR PEACE: SEVEN CRITICAL YEARS IN THE PENTAGON 51-57 (1990).
10. See discussion infra Part I.
1L See discussion infra Part II.
12. U.S. CoNST. amend. V.
13. See discussion infra Part III.
14. See RICHARD SPENCER ET AL., DEF. Bus. BD., REPORT TO THE SECRETA_RY OF DEFENSE: MoDERNIZING THE MILITARY RETIREMENT SYSTEM 5 (2011) available at http://
dbb.defense.gov/pd£1DBB _Military_Retirement_Final_Presentationpdf. pdf. See generally DEF. Bus. BD., http://dbb.defense.gov/members.shtml (last visited Jan. 16, 2013)
(providing information on the members of the DBB). It is notable that the DBB is composed primarily of males who serve in senior management positions in corporations.
DEF. Bus. Bn., supra. It is unclear whether a lawyer advised DBB on the ramifications
of their proposed changes or the litigation that might ensue.
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cate resources, thereby making the program sustainable. 15 Nor did
the DEB's methodology appear to have considered the legal implications of their proposal. The DBB claimed that the current system of
retirements is unfair because it excludes individuals who serve for
less than twenty years, but this is a relatively new or invented concern. A century of judicial precedent has never held the current retirement system to be unfair. The DEB's proposed change, then, was
truly based on an economic model and not on morality or fairness. Indeed, that their proposal did not "grandfather" current serving members, provides tangential falsity to the DEB's stated concerns of
fairness. 16
What set the DEB's proposal apart from most of the other calls for
reform was its push for immediate implementation. There was no
true "grandfathering" of current forces to the twenty year retirement.
During this period, Congress convened a committee of twelve members, consisting of six Republicans and six Democrats. This committee
essentially met without full transparency as to how it intended to arrive at its conclusions. 17 The committee may have considered the
DEB's proposal and adopted it in some form as its own. Although that
committee failed to produce any consensus, Congress might as yet
adopt the DEB's proposal or some other variant of it. If it does so,
Congress will, in tum, be required to vote on the draft legislation
without the ability of individual legislators to offer amendments. 18
This Article does not address the wisdom of the legislative methods
employed as a result of the so-called "debt compromise," but it does
point out three areas of concern for military readiness, and more
pointedly, military discipline. The premise of this part of the Article is
that a 401(k) program, as envisioned by the DBB, based on mandatory
contributions to the Thrift Savings Program ("TSP") would be an unlawful policy, and the implementation of such a policy will irreparably
weaken military discipline.
To contextualize the potential ramifications of the DEB's proposed mandatory 401(k) contributions, as well as other 401(k) type
15. SPENCER ET AL., supra note 14.
16. See infra notes 36-49 and accompanying text.
17. See, e.g., Press Release, Rep. Jeb Hensarling & Sen. Patty Murray, Co-Chairs,
J. Select Comm. on Deficit Reduction, Statement from Co-Chairs of the Joint Select
Committee on Deficit Reduction (Nov. 21, 2011), available at http://cybercemetery.unt
.edu/archive/deficit/20120113174936/http://www .deficitreduction.gov/public/index.cfm/
2011/11/statement-from-co-chairs-of-the-joint-select-committee-on-deficit-reduction.
18. See HENNING, supra note 4, at 17 ("DOD would make a proposal to the commission which can then add or delete provisions as it deems appropriate. It would then be
forwarded to the President who can also make changes but must decide whether to
forward the recommendations to Congress. If forwarded, Congress must approve or disapprove without any modifications.").
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proposals, it is helpful to reflect on the nation's military history. A
Saint Louis Reporter during a news conference on May 23, 1956 asked
President Eisenhower whether persistent in-fighting about funding
between the service-branches and Congress eroded military discipline.
Broadening his answer beyond the question, Eisenhower responded,
"the day that discipline disappears from our armed forces, we will
have no forces, and we would be foolish to put a nickel in them." 19
fl~isenhower diligently worked to decrease defense budgets, but he understood that legislative manipulations had the potential to undermine the military's discipline, and this is as true today as it was in
Eisenhower's time. Moreover, Eisenhower's determination to decrease the defense budget was predicated on an intelligent understanding of the nation's military culture and history. In the aftermath
of the Civil War, congressional acts to decrease the Army's budget
were targeted at pay and retirement with disastrous consequences to
morale. 20
A decade prior to Eisenhower's pronouncement, during a War Department committee deliberation on whether to recommend implementing a proposed President's Advisory Commission on Universal
Training, President Harry 'fruman addressed the initial session,
stating:
The great republics of the past always passed out when their
people became prosperous and fat and lazy and were not willing to assume the necessary responsibilities for that republic
to continue. In other words, when the Romans and the
Greeks, and some of the ancient Mesopotamian countries
turned to mercenary defense forces, they ended, That is,
when the people in their government ceased their military obligations because they would not do the necessary service to
continue that government, they ended eventually in one way
or another. That has been true of modern nations also. 21
Truman's view of the underlying reasons for the fall of Rome and
Periclean Greece was oversimplified, but the point he articulated
about a republican government's abandonment of its obligations and
19. President Dwight D. Eisenhower, President's News Conference (May 23, 1956),
available at http://www,presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=10498.
20. See, e.g,, DoN RICKEY, JR., FoRTY MILES A DAY ON BEANS AND HAY (1963); RoBERT M. UTLEY, FRONTIER REGULARS: THE UNITED STATES ARMY AND THE INDIAN", 18661900, at 19-20 (1984).
21. President Harry S. Truman, Remarks to the President's Advisory Commission
on Universal Training (Dec. 20, 1946), available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/
index.php?pid=l2565. Joseph Davies, a former ambassador to the Soviet Union, was
one of eleven citizens appointed to the President's Advisory Commission on Universal
Training that was headed by Karl Compton, the president of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. See id. (providing the members appointed to the commission in a
note following the speech transcript).
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promises to its military members leading to the decline of its military
forces is credible. With the Chinese government publicly calling on
the United States to reduce its defense expenditures, it is clear that
this potential adversary will be strengthened by distrust within the
United States military forces toward its political leadership. 22 It is
also clear that for the second time since World War II a potential nation-state adversary will have the ability to exploit a perceived American military weakness to coerce its neighbors. 23
In 1945, the leadership of the Communist Party of the United
States ("CPUSA"), at the behest of the Soviet Union, attempted to
stoke demobilization demonstrations in the Pacific and Europe; while
at the same time, the CPUSA attempted to cause labor strikes at
Western Union, the means by which the War Department notified
soldiers of their release from active duty. The Soviet Union's plan
failed because Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI") agents discovered it, and even if the FBI had not discovered Soviet intentions to
undermine the United States' armed forces, Soviet military conduct in
occupied Europe was so brutal that their efforts at coercion were unlikely to succeed. 24 Ironically, based on the analysis below, the DBB,
on behalf of the nation's current and potential future adversaries',
might have unwittingly succeeded where the Soviet Union and
CPUSA failed two generations earlier. 2 5
Clearly, the nation continues to need a disciplined force. In 1992,
future Secretary of Defense Les Aspin, then serving in Congress, ar22. See, e.g., Bob Davis & Aaron Back, China Slams U.S. Over Debt, WALL ST. J.,
July 29, 2011, at C3; Austin Ramzy, After Downgrade, Chinese Press Blasts U.S. Borrowing, TIME (Aug. 6, 2011), available at http:l/world.time.com/2011108/07/after-down
grade-chinese-press-blasts-u-s/.
23. David Barboza, China Tells U.S. It Must 'Cure Its Addiction to Debt,' N.Y.
TIMES (Aug. 6, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/07/business/globallchina-a-bigcreditor-says-us-has-only-itself-to-blame.html?_r=1&; Nelson D. Schwartz & Eric Dash,
Amid Criticism of Downgrade of U.S., S.&P. Fires Back, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 6, 2011),
http://www .nytimes.com/2011/08/07/business/a-rush-to-assess-standard-and-poorsdowngrade-of-united-states-credit-rating.html?pagewanted=all&_r=O.
24. See Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover, Dir., Fed. Bureau of Investigation, to
President Harry S. Truman (Jan. 11, 1946) (on file with the Library of Congress) [hereinafter Memorandum from Hoover to Truman (Jan. 11)]; Memorandum from J. Edgar
Hoover, Dir., Fed. Bureau oflnvestigation, to President Harry S. Truman (Jan. 9, 1946)
(on file with the Library of Congress) [hereinafter Memorandum from Hoover to Truman (Jan. 9)]; see also RoBERT H. FERRELL, HARRY S. TRUMAN: A LIFE 227-28 (1996); R.
Alton Lee, The Army Mutiny of 1946, 53 J. AM. HisT. 555-71 (1966).
25. See generally FERRELL, supra note 24, at 227-28; JoHN EARL HAYNEs & HARVEY
KLEHR, EARLY CoLD WAR SPIES 23-66 (2006); Lee, supra note 24, at 555-71; Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover, Dir. Fed. Bureau of Investigation, to President Harry S.
Truman (Jan. 29, 1946) (on file with the Library of Congress); Memorandum from J.
Edgar Hoover, Dir., Fed. Bureau of Investigation, to President Harry S. Truman (Jan.
18, 1946) (on file with the Library of Congress); Memorandum from Hoover to Truman
(Jan. 11), supra note 24; Memorandum from Hoover to Truman (Jan. 9), supra note 24.
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gued, "[i]n the new world of present and future, we must contemplate
an action that only the political right has previously considered: the
possibility of conducting a preemptive attack to prevent countries
from gaining nuclear arsenals." 26 To ensure that the United States
possessed a disciplined and visible deterrent, Aspin disfavored significant budget reductions, risky liberalization of Uniform Code of Military Justice jurisdiction, and unsettling economization of government
obligations to service members. 27 Aspin, like Weinberger, argued that
for the purposes of morale and discipline, the government had to
maintain its obligations to its service members. The same wisdom
that Weinberger, Laird, and Aspin articulated-three Secretaries of
Defense representing the political spectrum-remains pertinent to the
treatment of the military today.
II.

LEGAL IMPEDIMENTS TO ALTERING THE CURRENT
RETIREMENT

It is a legal truism that service-members' pay is governed by statute and not by common law contract principles. 28 This is despite the
fact that in 1890, in United States v. Grimley, 29 the United States Supreme Court determined that an enlistment is a contract between a
soldier and the government. 30 It is also true that in 1883, in United
States v. Teller, 31 the Court held that military pensions "are the bounties of the government, which congress has the right to give, withhold,
distribute, or recall, at its discretion." 32 However, the Court, in Teller,
did not decide whether a veteran was entitled to a pension, but rather,
whether Congress was empowered to terminate the receipt of "double
pensions."3 3 While the veteran in Teller had served in the military, no
promise of a double pension had been made while he was in the Army,
and indeed, the veteran had served in the Mexican-American War, but
only became entitled to a double pension in 1879. 34 For reasons discussed below, the 1883 decision only addressed broad principles of
26. Representative Les Aspin, Chairman of the House Comm. on Armed Servs.,
Congress and the Future of the United States Military (Jan. 23, 1992).
27. Id.
28. See, e.g., United States v. Larionoff, 431 U.S. 864, 869 (1977) (citing Bell v.
United States, 366 U.S. 393, 401 (1961)).
29. 137 U.S. 147 (1890).
30. United States v. Grimley, 137 U.S. 147, 150-51 (1890).
31. 107 U.S. 64 (1883).
32. United States v. Teller, 107 U.S. 64, 68 (1883).
33. Teller, 107 U.S. at 67.
34. Id. The veteran was Ward B. Burnett, who, after the Mexican fu-nerican War,
became the Surveyor General for the Kansas and Nebraska Territories. See, e.g., Ward
B. Burnett Papers: A Guide, U. TEx. ARLINGTON LIBR., http://www.lib.utexas.edu/taro/
utarJJ02114/arl-02114.html (last visited Dec. 12, 2012).
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gov-ernment immunity, and it did not implicate the 'rakings Clause35
or the
of detrimental reliance,
To fully understand the relationship between military retirements, the twin aspects of rights and reliance, and discipline, it is important to note the military's subordination to the civil government,
and how alterations in the retirement structure may damage this
relationship,
A.

ERoSION OF THE CIVIL MILITARY CoNSTRUC'r

Since the 2003 invasion of
a number of writers have cited to
a growing rift in civil-military relations. 36 For instance, in 2007 Bush
administration attorney John Yoo and United States Coast Guard
Judge Advocate Glenn Sulmasy posited in a UCLA. Law Review Article
that the actions of senior military officers assigned to the four Judge
Advocate General's Departments
the constitutional hierarchy of
the civilian government ascendant over the military at risk. 37 Their
thesis was attacked by several of the sources they cited to, and one
source countered that the danger to the relationship was in the administration's discounting of international law constraints. 38 Retired
Major General Charles Dunlap, one of the leading scholars in military
law with extensive operational
countered that Yoo's scholarship on executive branch authority is what endangered the civil-military construct because it advocated flexibility in the law which simply
did not exist. 39 Indeed, one
the proposals that Yoo and Sulmasy
concocted in their thesis was that the executive branch could punish
officers who testified to Congress against an administration's
35. U.S. CoNsT. amend. V.
36. See, e.g., Damon Coletta, Courage in the Service of' Virtue: The Case of' General
Shinseki's Testimony Before the lraq War, 34 ARMED FoRCES & Soc'y 109 (2007); Geoffrey Corn & Eric Talbot Jensen, The Political Balance of Power Over the Military: Rethinking the Relationship Between the Armed Forces, The President, and Congress, 44
Hous. L. REv. 553 (2007); Deborah L. Perlstein, The Soldier, the State, and the Separation of Powers, 90 TEx. L. REv. 797 (2012). Even before September 11, 2001, some commentators believed there was a growing rift between the military and society. See, e.g.,
Thomas E. Ricks, The Widening Gap Between the Military and Society, ArLANTIC
MoNTHLY, July 1997, at 66, 70.
37. See John Yoo & Glenn Sulmasy, Challenges to Civil Control of the Military: A
Rational Choice Approach to the War on Terror, 54 UCLA L. REv. 1815 (2007).
38. See, e.g., Richard H. Kohn, Comment on Professor John Yoo, Administration of'
War, 58 Dmm L.J. 2313 (2009). It is notable that Yoo considered Kohn one of the foremost scholars in the field of civil-military relations; see also CHARLIE SAVAGE, 'rMillOVER,
THE RETURN OF THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY AND THE 8UBVEHSION OF AM:ERICAc"' DEMOC-

(2007); Victor Hansen, Understanding the Role of Military Lawyers in the War on
Terror: A Response to the Perceived Crisis in Civil-Military Relations, 50S. TEx. L. REv.
617 (2009).
39. See Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., A Tale of' Two Judges: A Judge Advocate's Reflections on Judge Gonzalez's Apologia, 42 TEx. TEcH L. REv. 893, 898-99 (2010).
RACY
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yet they failed to cite to a single statute or even cognizable legal theory that would give the executive branch this authority. Moreover, in
a general sense, the United States Supreme Court, in its 1946 decision
of United States v. Lovett,40 roundly rejected Yoo's and Sulmasy's idea
of a military expressly without any flexibility bound to the executive
branch. Admittedly, Lovett had nothing to do with the military, but
the Court in that decision determined the concept of restricting executive branch employees had to both serve a legitimate (and not fanciful)
purpose and not be a bill of attainder. 41 For instance, a legitimate
purpose might include the withholding of monies in response to a taking of a bribe. In short, had Yoo's and Sulmasy's theory been adopted
as national defense policy it would undermine the public's trust in the
military.
Agreeing with General Dunlap's approach to civil-military relations, it is clear that one of the more worrisome threats to civil-military relations is an executive branch attempt to issue or enforce an
unlawful order. Certainly, Congress does not order the military to do
anything, but its power of the purse creates parameters for all policies
and regulations, and certainly this has an effect on morale. Congress
may, of course, legislate on and order individual service-members to
testify about military benefits. Congress may also leave the responsibility of defining future retirement benefits to the executive branch.
If service-members believe that the government had promised a
twenty-year military retirement, and that retirement in its full current form were taken away without any grandfathering of currently
serving personnel, then a clear distrust of Congress within the ranks
would lead to the erosion of civil-military relations. More detrimental,
however, to the civil-military construct would be a statutory invalidation of a perceived right, and it may well be the case that a sizeable
number of current service-members believe that retirements are a
right. It is unclear whether the federal judiciary would consider the
current military retirement as a property interest-in essence, a
right-but there is no clear law on this point. The statutes governing
military retirements do not state that the government may take away
unvested retirements for non-criminal or non-fitness related reasons,
or through a statutorily mandated reduction in force. 42 Indeed, the
law governing the computation of retired pay makes no mention that
40. 328 u.s. 303 (1946).
41. See United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 315 (1946).
42. See 10 U.S.C. §§ 1461-1463 (2012) (establishing the Department of Defense
Military Retirement Fund, and providing for what the assets of the fund and payments
from the fund should be). Statutorily, the Secretary of the Treasury administers the
Department of Defense Military Retirement Fund, which disburses military
retirements.
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retirement payments are at risk, instead making the optimistic comment that when a service-member is entitled to more than one calculation formula, they are entitled to pay under the more favorable
calculation. 43
The plain statutory language governing retirements is simple. A
military member who serves twenty years of active duty is entitled to
a retirement based on fifty percent of his or her pay of the final three
years of service. 44 Service-members who serve longer are entitled to
escalated retirement payments. Unlike civil service employees, retired commissioned officers and enlisted personnel are subject to be
recalled to active duty. 45
It is true that a service-member who separates before twenty
years of service is generally entitled to no retirement, absent medical
retirements. 46 It is also true that a service-member who is court-martialed and punitively discharged from the military loses his or her retirement as a result of the punitive discharge. 47 But it has never been
established whether honorably serving service-members, who meet
military standards as a class, can be divested of the twenty year retirement. It is notable that in neither the Defense Business Board
("DBB") or the Congressional Research Service ("CRS") reports has
this, or any other issue oflaw, been addressed.
There are some immediately apparent distinguishing features of
the federal civil service Thrift Savings Program ("TSP") which the
DBB proposal appeared to lack. In the federal civil service, TSP is
voluntary in the sense that there is no required percentage of income
that civilian employees are forced to contribute, and these investments are not insured against loss. 48 The DEB's proposed solution is
a mandated 16.5% contribution, based off a member's salary, but with
the deferred tax implications accruing to the member. 49
43. 10 U.S.C. § 1401(b).
44. The Military Retirement System, MrLITARY.COM, http://www.military.com/
benefits/military-pay/the-military-retirement-system.html (last visited Dec. 12, 2012).
45. See, e.g., Barker v. Kansas, 503 U.S. 594, 599 (1992). The Court, in determining that Kansas could not tax military retirements in a different manner than state
employee retirements, recognized military retirees unquestionably remain in the service and are subject to restrictions and recall; in these respects they are different from
other retirees. Barker, 503 U.S. at 605.
46. See generally 10 U.S.C. subpt. A, pt. II.
47. McCarty v. McCarty, 453 U.S. 210, 222 (1981), superseded by statute, Uniformed Services Former Spouses Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 97-252, 96 Stat. 718 (1982),
as recognized in Barker, 503 U.S. at 602; Loeh v. United States, 73 Fed. Cl. 327, 329
(2006).
48. See generally 5 U.S. C. § 8472 (2012) (describing the governance of the Federal
Thrift Saving Program); I.R.C. §§ 401-409a (2012) (providing information regarding the
laws governing 401(k) type plans).
49. SPENCER ET AL., supra note 14, at 22.
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MILITARY RETIREMENTS, PROPERTY INTERESTS, AI\fD THE TAKINGS
CLAUSE

There is a basis for considering military retirem_ents, including
those not yet earned, as a property interest that the government could
not take away from current honorably serving service members. It is
likely that the overwhelming majority of service-members, who have
served for over ten years, have done so in the belief that the government would continue the twenty year retirement. Setting aside the
question of reliance, it is important to acknowledge what servicemembers voluntarily forgo during their service.
Decided in 1974, the United States Supreme Court in Johnson v.
Robison 5° articulated a non-exclusive list of what makes uniformed
service different than other employment. 51 The Robison case arose
from a challenge of a conscientious objector who had performed alternate employment but had been denied veterans benefits. 52 In addition to determining the statutory jurisdiction of federal courts so as
not to preclude review of constitutional challenges raised under the
various veterans acts raised, the Court articulated that it was permissible for Congress to create a class of beneficiaries of veterans, even
though the creation might have the appearance of religious discrimination.53 Most conscientious objectors (including those who performed alternative civilian service) opposed military service on the
basis of faith, so it was clear that a colorable prima facie Equal Protection argument could be made for conscientious objectors. The Court
found the creation of a class of beneficiaries acceptable because the
Act "compensate[s] for the disruption that military service causes to
civilian lives." 54 The Court went on to further note that service-members "suffer a far greater loss of personal freedom during their service
careers. Uprooted from civilian life, the military veteran becomes part
of the military establishment, subject to its discipline and potentially
hazardous duty."55
The Robison decision is only a starting point for describing the
relinquishment of ordinary rights. Service-members voluntarily agree
to temporarily divest themselves of the almost unlimited right of free
speech56 enumerated in the First Amendment. 57 Service-members
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
to seek

415 u.s. 361 (1974).
Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 378-80 (1974).
Robison, 415 U.S. at 363-66.
I d. at 373-7 4, 384-85.
I d. at 377-78.
Id. at 379.
U.S. CoNST. amend. I.
See, e.g., Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348, 358 (1980) (upholding the requirement
permission before circulating petitions); Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, '761-62
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may not participate in political demonstrations except under specified
conditions. 58 Indeed, the Court in Greer v. Spock 59 recognized that
the need to insulate the military from political affiliation could result
in excluding political organizations from installations. 60 Even the religious rights of service-members may be narrowed for legitimate military needs. 61 Criticism of the executive branch, or individuals in
government, is not unfettered for individuals subject to the Uniform
Code of Military Justice ("UCMJ"). 62 In Priest v. Secretary of the
Navy, 63 the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia upheld the
court-martial conviction of a sailor who, in part, publicly disparaged
individual members of Congress and Federal Bureau of Investigations
Director, .J. Edgar Hoover. 64 Unlike their federal civil service counterparts, service-members are not permitted to unionize, and while the
reasons for this prohibition are obvious, this prohibition is another example that the right of assembly is voluntarily divested upon joining
the military.65
In 1975, the Court decided Schlesinger v. Councilman 66 and held,
"to ensure that they always are capable of performing their mission
promptly and reliably, the military services must insist upon a respect
for duty and a discipline without counterpart in civilian life."67 Thus,
whether stemming from the continual need for a cohesive force, or in
the enforcement of the military's disciplinary system, there are fewer
of the clear rights in the military that a civilian would expect. It is
impossible to put a fiscal value on the voluntary divestment of the full
array of individual rights that a service-member would have if the ser(1974) (upholding the conviction for an ofticer who, in part, openly criticized United
States participation in the Vietnam Conflict).
58. Culver v. Sec'y of the Air Force, 559 F.2d 622, 630 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
59. 424 u.s. 828 (1976).
60. Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 843-45 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring).
61. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986). In Goldberg, the Court
accepted the Air Force's argument that the wearing of a yarmulke, a religious accoutrement, while in uniform could be prohibited for a compelling military interest such as
uniformity. Goldberg, 475 U.S. at 509-10. However, later Congress passed legislation
undermining the decision. 10 U.S.C. § 774 (2012).
62. See, e.g., Sec'y of the Navy v. Avrech, 418 U.S. 676 (1974).
63. 570 F.2d 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
64. Priest v. Sec'y of the Navy, 570 F.2d 1013, 1015-19 (D.C. Cir. 1977); see also
United States v. Priest, 46 C.M.R. 368 (N.C.M.R. 1971). In Priest, the sailor published a
newsletter that derided Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird, Federal Bureau of Investigations Director J. Edgar Hoover, and compared House Armed Services Chair, Congressman Mendel Rivers to "a pig pissing and shitting on the country." See, e.g., JAMES
LEwEs, PROTEST AND SuRviVE: UNDERGROUND GI NEWSPAPERS DuRING THE VIETNAM
WAR 51-82 (2003); see also The Law: Priest's Progress, TIME, May 11, 1970.
65. 10 U.S.C. § 976 (2012).
66. 420 u.s. 738 (1975).
67. Schlesinger v. Councilman, 420 U.S. 738, 757 (1975); see also Curry v. Sec'y of
the Army, 595 F.2d 873, 880 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
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vice-member were to return to civilian life, but it is certainly legitimate to consider this voluntary divestment of rights in light of
whether service-members possess a property interest in a traditional
twenty year retirement. 68 On the other hand, these rights are quantifiable in value as the federal courts have routinely considered challenges by service-members against regulations to exceed the statutory
thresholds of damages required for judicial review.
Concededly, property interests are non-constitutional in nature,
in the sense that the U.S. Constitution does not define what property
is exactly. The Court in Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth 69
held that in order to have a property interest, a person must have
more than "abstract need," "desire," or "unilateral expectation of iL" 70
A person must have a legitimate expectation of the interest. 71 In the
absence of a court-martial or the administrative act of being "dropped
from the rolls," there is a sincere, albeit, untested argument that significant changes to retirement laws, without j:;'Tandfathering all existing service-members would, in essence, create an unlawful taking of
the property interest, where the retirement is statutorily constructed.
The Court hinted at such a construct in Goldberg v. Kelly, 72 a
recipient case. 73
It is true that several federal judicial decisions considered the
question of whether service-members possess a property interest in a
military retirement; however, these courts considered this question
only in the context of individual service-members, and not all servicemembers taken at one time. 74 In each of these decisions,
servicemember lost his retirement on the basis of administrative discharges,
usually due to misconduct. On the other hand, one admittedly obscure
1975 opinion from the United States Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia Circuit does appear to support the contention that property interests of honorably serving service-members with less than
twenty years of active duty does exist. 7 5
68. See Cortright v. Resor, 447 F.2d 245 (2d Cir. 1971) (deciding that the Army
could transfer a service-member whose speech undermined discipline, but that the
value of the speech challenged was over $10,000 and therefore a justiciable matter).
But see Yahr v. Resor, 431 F.2d 690 (4th Cir. 1970).
69. 408 u.s. 564 (1972).
70. Bd. of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972).
71. Roth, 408 U.S. at 577.
72. 397 u.s. 254 (1970).
73. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 269-70 (1970). The Court in Goldberg v.
Kelly held that a person in receipt of welfare payments possesses a legitimate interest in
the payments that is safeguarded by procedural due process. Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 26970.
74. See, e.g., Flowers v. United States, 80 Fed. CL 201 (2008); Kinney v. United
States, 51 Fed. Cl. 126 (2001).
75. See Fairbank v. Schlesinger, 533 F.2d 586 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
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Because the Defense Business Board's ("DBB") methodology did
not include a survey of the opinions of service-members, such as had
been done during the repeal process of 10 U.S.C. § 654 (i.e., "Don't
Ask, Don't Tell"), the government could not even anecdotally know
whether service-members believed they were promised the twenty
year retirement. 76 Why the DBB used a limited methodology in light
of the gravity of their study, in comparison to the voluminous surveys
to gauge service readiness for the repeal of the statutory prohibition
against openly homosexual service-members is suspect. Certainly
modifications to retirements will have as great an impact, and in the
author's opinion, a far greater impact to military readiness than the
repeal. The shortcomings in the DBB's methodology could also easily
apply to the related theory of detrimental reliance.

C.

DETRIMENTAL RELIANCE

The theory of detrimental reliance relates to takings, but it is not
expressly spelled out in the Fifth Amendment. In Heckler v. Community Health Services of Crawford County, Inc.,7 7 the United States Supreme Court explained the government is liable for detrimental
reliance if a plaintiff, or class of plaintiffs, relied on the government's
conduct, changed position for the worse, and reasonably claims estoppels because the misleading nature of the conduct was unknown and
unexpected. 78 It is true that the issue in the Heckler case involved the
government's recoupment of overpayments within the Medicare construct. Nonetheless, the theory of detrimental reliance has applicability to military law. 79 As early as 1871, the Court held that the
government was liable to compensate a citizen for the use of the citizen's cargo vessels, even in the absence of a specific contract. 80
In United States v. Caltex, lnc., 81 the Court determined that there
was a difference between the government's destruction of private
property so that the property could not become an instrument of war
for an enemy belligerent, and the government's appropriation of private property. 82 The Caltex case arose from the Army's destruction of
76. See, e.g., JEH CHARLES JOHNSON ET AL., DEP'T OF DEF., REPORT ON THE COMPREHENSIVE REviEw OF THE IssuEs AssoCIATED WITH A REPEAL oF DoN'T AsK, DoN'T TELL
63-79 (2010), available at http://www.defense.gov/home/features/2010/0610_dadt/DADT
Report_FINAL_20101130(secure-hires).pdf.
77. 467 u.s. 51 (1984).
78. Heckler v. Cmty. Health Servs. of Crawford Cnty., Inc., 467 U.S. 51, 59 (1984)
(quoting Wilber Nat'l Bank v. United States, 294 U.S. 120, 124-25 (1935)).
79. See, e.g., Doe v. United States, 95 Fed. Cl. 546 (2010); People ofBikini v. United
States, 77 Fed. Cl. 7,!4 (2007).
80. See United States v. Russell, 80 U.S. 623 (1871).
81. 344 U.S. 149 (1952).
82. United States v. Caltex, Inc., 344 U.S. 149, 153-55 (1952).
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oilfield and petroleum transfer facilities in the Philippines after the
Japanese invasion of 1941. 83 It could hardly be argued that the termination of retirement benefits of currently serving service-members
amounts to a destruction of property. Perhaps the only argument that
advocates of retirement reform could make would be an argument
found in Totten v. United States, 84 a decision arising from a claim to
compensation for working as a spy for the Union. In late July 1861,
President Abraham Lincoln entered into a personal agreement with
an individual named William A. Lloyd for compensation of $200.00 per
month. 85 Lloyd travelled into the Confederacy and, at great personal
risk, provided Lincoln intelligence on Confederate strength during the
war. 86 However, following Lincoln's death, the Union did not honor
the agreement. The Court decided against granting Lloyd any rightful claim, but that was only because of a general law of war policy that
enabled the government to withhold matters of secrecy from the public
view. 87

D.

INi-.PPLICABILITY OF

Schism v. United States

It is likely that the Defense Business Board's ("DEB") proponents
will look to judicial acquiescence in the alteration of veterans' health
care. In Schism v. United States, 88 the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit determined that the government may alter, or withdraw, from its pledge of lifetime military medical care for
veterans in retirement status. 89 The United States District Court for
the District of Northern Florida, had determined that, in the absence
of a statutory right, retirees did not have a contractual right to military health care. 90 The issue arose as a result of the government
83. Caltex, Inc., 344 U.S. at 150-51.
84. 92 U.S. 105 (1875).
85. Totten v. United States, 92 U.S. 105, 105-06 (1875).
86. See Totten, 92 U.S. at 105-06.
87. Id. at 107. The Court specifically held:
It may be stated as a general principle, that public policy forbids the maintenance of any suit in a court of justice, the trial of which would inevitably lead to
the disclosure of matters which the law itself regards as confidential, and respecting which it will not allow the confidence to be violated. On this principle,
suits cannot be maintained which would require a disclosure of the confidences
of the confessional, or those between husband and wife, or of communications
by a client to his counsel for professional advice, or of a patient to his physician
for a similar purpose. Much greater reason exists for the application of the
principle to cases of contract for secret services with the government, as the
existence of a contract of that kind is itself a fact not to be disclosed.
I d. Given this language, it would be difficult to see how a court could apply Totten to the
issue addressed herein.
88. 316 F.3d 1259 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
89. Schism v. United States, 316 F.3d 1259, 1272 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (citing Lynch v.
United States, 292 U.S. 571, 577 (1934)).
90. Schism v. United States, 19 F. Supp. 2d 1287, 1295 (N.D. Fla. 1998).
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transferring retirees from the Veterans Administration health care
system into Medicare. 91 Two plaintiffs sued the government.
At the time, both plaintiffs reenlisted with the determination to
fuHill a twenty-year active duty military service, military recruiters
used the promise of lifetime medical care to enable high retention
rates. 92 Although the named plaintiffs only numbered two retirees,
hundreds of thousands of veterans could have easily fell into the same
category. The district court noted that at the time both of the plaintiffs enlisted, which occurred prior to 1956, there was no governing
statute regarding lifetime medical care. 93 In the absence of a contractual obligation, the district court turned to the Fifth Amendment's
Takings Clause94 and determined "the enactment of a statute reducing benefits did not constitute a takings without compensation, where
the benefits are non-contractual in nature." 95
In the absence of recognizing the full range of rights voluntarily
relinquished by volunteer service-members, the lower court's decision
is understandable. In Schism, the Federal Circuit affirmed the lower
court. 96 The Federal Circuit applied the principle articulated in Bell
v. United States 97 by the United States Supreme Court. In Bell, three
"turncoat prisoners of war," sued the government for back-pay after
their voluntary repatriation. 98 However distasteful, the Court determined that the government was bound by the applicable statutes and
obligated to pay the soldiers because there was no exemption from disbursing back-pay for "turncoat prisoners ofwar."99 It is true that the
Court, in Bell, noted the broad principle that statutes, rather than
common-law contract principles, define entitlement programs; however, it could be argued that even the "turncoat prisoners of war" relied on the government to fulfill its obligations. 100
91. See Schism, 19 F. Supp. 2d at 1298.
92. See id. at 1288, 1294. The bulk of the lower court's decision was spent analyzing the plaintiffs' claims within the context of the "Little Tucker Act," and not the Fifth
Amendment. I d. That act provides concurrent jurisdiction to the United States district
courts and Federal Court of Claims for claims below $10,000. 28 U.S. C. § 1346 (2012).
93. Schism, 19 F. Supp. 2d at 1291.
94. U.S. CoNST. amend. V.
95. Schism, 19 F. Supp. 2d at 1295.
96. See Schism, 316 F.3d at 1264.
97. 366 u.s. 393 (1961).
98. Bell v. United States, 366 U.S. 393, 394 (1961). The Court decided the Bell case
four months after President John F. Kennedy took office and one month before the Bay
of Pigs invasion. Time magazine reported that despite the victory in court, the three
men were living below poverty levels and could not maintain employment. Back Pay for
Turncoats, TIME, June 2, 1961, at 20.
99. Bell, 366 U.S. at 402.
100. See id. at 401.
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The Federal Circuit also turned to United States v. Larionoff, 101
another Supreme Court opinion, for the principle that statutes govern
all pay and entitlements, including "bonus pay," and not the promises
of the military departments. 102 In this case, the plaintiff Larionoff
was not denied a reenlistment bonus, but rather, he was denied a
greater reenlistment bonus than most other sailors were entitled to as
a result of the Department of the Navy removing his specific occupational specialty from a list of critical positions. 103 The government's
briefto the Court argued that bonus pay was not generalized pay, and
the Court appeared to accept this argument. 104 Unlike the issues discussed in Larionoff and Schism, the current issue regarding pay and
retirement is governed by statute. 105
The Schism decision tracked with the Larionoff decision, in determining that military recruiters were not statutorily empowered to
promise medical care for life. Additionally, because the Air Force, at
the time of the reenlistments, practiced a space-available medical care
system for retirees, there was ample evidence, at least to the majority
of the judges on the Federal Circuit, that the military retirement system was not wholly open to all retirees. 106 This fact pattern is hardly
analogous to imposing retirement alterations on currently serving service-members.

E. UNLAWFUL ORDERs: THE MANDATORY TSP CoNTRIBUTION PLAN
BY ANALOGY
While it must be acknowledged that the federal courts have not
been asked to determine whether the promise of a twenty-year retirement creates a property interest which Congress lacks the authority
to dissolve, there is an equally troubling aspect to the Defense Business Board's ("DBB") proposal: the mandatory Thrift Savings Plan
("TSP") contribution scheme. It is questionable as to whether the
United States government can force a service-member, any more than
it can compel a civilian, to pay into a specific investment portfolio. If
this were so, a commander, by analogy, could compel all personnel entering a stateside base to drive an American manufactured automo··
101. 431 U.S. 864 (1977).
102. Schism, 316 F.3d at 1272 (citing United States v. Larionoff, 431 U.S. 864, 869
(1977)).
103. Larionoff, 431 U.S. at 868.
104. See id. at 874 (distinguishing between general and bonus pay); Brief for the
Petitioners at 19-26, United States v. Larionoff, 431 U.S. 864 (1977) (No. 76-413), 1977
WL 189370, at *19-26 (arguing bonus pay was a specific sum).
105. See Larionoff, 431 U.S. at 877 (describing pay and retirement governed by regulations); Schism, 316 F.3d at 1300 (stating Congress has not used its power to address
the issue).
106. Schism, 316 F.3d at 1283-84.
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bile. What if a service-member believed, for instance, that a private
investment group such as the United Services Automobile Association
("USAA'') or Prudential was more soundly managed than TSP? The
service-member should be entitled to forgo the TSP contribution.
Likewise, it is not outside of the realm of possibility that an individual
service-member would be opposed to the composition ofthe TSP directorship, or the TSP's investment into corporations whose policies the
service-member finds repugnant. It is clear that no government
agency may force the service-member to invest personal monies into
an essentially private corporation under such circumstances. It may
be that the DBB, or for that matter the twelve member congressional
committee, believes that Article I, Section 8, Clause 12 of the Constitution107 empowers Congress to extend this authority grant to include
control over personal finances, including mandating payments into a
specified 401(k). This belief would not likely be approved by the
courts because it would run counter to a myriad of other laws and
limits on government authority.
The challenged Patient Protection and Affordable Health Care
Act 108 ("PPAHC") is perhaps the most favorable analogy to the DBB's
proposal. The question of whether the Constitution grants Congress
the authority to legislate individual citizens to purchase health care
insurance became a hotly contested issue after the passage of the
PPAHC. This Act required most Americans to purchase an insurance
policy within specified coverage limits. 109 Although in National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, 110 the United States Supreme Court upheld the PPAHC's individual mandate, the PPAHC
mandated 401(k)-like contributions into a specific quasi-private account posed a different matter because the PPAHC enables residents
to choose between a myriad of private plans. 111
\Vhile it is true that the Court has, since the New Deal, broadly
construed congressional authority to regulate commerce, this authority has not been found to exist without bounds. Since 1995, the Court
found that the Gun Free School Zone Act of 1990 112 and the Violence
10'7. "To raise and support Armies, but no Appropriation of Money to that Use shall
be for a longer Term than two Years." U.S. CoNST. art. I, § 8, cl. 12.
108. Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010), amended by Health Care and Patient
Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124 Stat. 1029.
109. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119
(2010), amended by Health Care and Patient Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No.
111-152, 124 Stat. 1029.
110. 567 U.S. ~• 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
111. See Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. ~> ~' 132 S. Ct. 2566,
2608 (2012).
112. Pub. L. No. 101-647, 104 Stat. 4844 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)
(2012)).
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Against Women Act of 1994113 exceeded Congress' authority to regulate commerce. 114 Following the broad logic articulated in the Court's
decisions, it is unfathomable that a condition of military service could
be lawfully predicated on mandatory investments. Even if the government were to contribute 16.5% of a service-member's pay towards a
401(k), the current state of the law governing such investments would
constitute an unlawful favoritism toward one investment firm over all
others.
III.

EFFECTS OF CHANGE AT ANY TIME

This Article opened with the argument that alterations in the current system of military retirements that remove the government's obligations to service-members could have a detrimental effect on
military discipline. The questionable legality of the Defense Business
Board's ("DEB") proposal and the undermining of civil-military relations, when viewed alongside of the prohibition against taking property, or the theory of detrimental reliance, provides further context for
the potential to specifically undermine military discipline as described
below.
A.

INVALIDATION OF THE PUNITIVE DISCHARGE

Absent from any of the Defense Business Board's ("DEB") proposal was a cognizable legal theory in which the government could retain the monies paid into a 401(k) by the service-member. A 401(k)
contribution is the contributor's at the time of payment and is disbursed to the contributor on the achievement of a certain age. Indeed,
the laws covering the Thrift Savings Plan ("TSP") are highly protective of the recipients. 115
The Fifth Amendment prohibits the conversion of private property "for public use without just compensation." 116 There is a substantial difference between what the government can garnish from those
plans and the termination of retirement benefits under the current
system. Under the present disciplinary system, punitive discharges
adjudged by courts-martial divest former service-members of anumber of veteran's benefits and retirement pay. 117 The punitive dis113. Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1941 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (2012)).
114. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 607, 627 (2000) (determining that
the Violence Against Women Act exceeded CongTess' authority under the Commerce
Clause); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 551 (1994) (finding the Gun Free Schoo!
Zone Act exceeded Congress' authority under the Commerce Clause).
115. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 8351-8437 (2012).
116. U.S. CoNST. amend. V (emphasis added).
117. See, e.g., Clinton v. Goldsmith, 526 U.S. 529 (1999); Gosa v. Mayden, 413 U.S.
665 (1973).
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charge is unique to the military in its effect. For instance, a civilservice employee who has paid into the TSP program for five, fifteen,
or twenty-five years does not lose his or her account because of a federal or state conviction. While it is true that a court-martial could
adjudge a fine, a government seizure of a retirement account in most
instances would be an unconstitutional taking because the servicemember had contributed his or her monies. The government could
also seek to recoup losses from fraud crimes, but before it could do so,
it would have to initiate a seizure action through the federal courts. 118
Due to the fact that military retirements are not contributed into, the
punitive discharge statutes in the Uniform Code of Military Justice
("UCMJ"), and its predecessor Articles of War, do not violate the Takings Clause 119 of the Fifth Amendment. If service-members were
forced to contribute to their military retirements there would be a violation of the Takings Clause. Military retirements could no longer legally be taken under the UCMJ.
Minimizing the effect ofthe punitive discharge would be a significant departure from the expected discipline of the nation's profession
of arms. Dating to the Continental Army of 1775, the punitive discharge has been a mainstay of military discipline. 120 Even a servicemember court-martialed after twenty years of military service may
lose his or her retirement if the court-martial adjudges a punitive discharge. Under the DBB's proposal, a colonel, for instance, who abuses
his or her authority to a degree of criminality will risk losing very
little, because the vested 401(k) will remain intact as the colonel's
property. Likewise, under the DBB's proposal a court-martialed firstterm service-member or new officer will retain the 401(k) investments,
even when sentenced to a punitive discharge. 121 If the DBB had a
secondary intent on further civilianizing the military justice system,
the proposal would successfully contribute to this goal.
The UCMJ has undergone significant reform since its inception in
1950 to mirror federal criminal law, but not to the extent of abandoning the reason for a separate system in the first place (i.e., to en118. See, e.g., United States v. Duncan, 816 F.2d 153 (4th Cir. 1987); Duncan v.
Belcher, 813 F.2d 1335 (4th Cir. 1987).
119. U.S. CoNs'r. amend. V.
120. See WILLIAM WINTHROP, MILITARY LAW AND PRECEDENTS 405-08, 433 (2d ed.
1920).
121. Cf snpra note 47 and accompanying text. Because the DBB proposal makes
the 401(k) a form of personal property and there is no provision in the UCMJ enabling
seizure or a taking of personal property, adoption of the DBB proposal would allow service-members to retain their investment even in the face of punitive discharge or courtmartial. While a court-martial has the ability to fine a person, such fines are generally
only applicable to financial crimes and may be further contested.
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hance the national security of the United
This is an
important point. From the enactment of the UCMJ in 1950, to Solorio
v. United States 123 in 1987, military professionals have decried the
increasing civilianization of the military justice system. 124 One need
look at a body of case law beginning in 1969 with O'Callahan u.
Parker, l25 which
divested the military of jurisdiction over
thousands of service-members who committed offenses in the Continental United States, to Solorio, which restored the full jurisdiction of
the UCMJ to find that when judicial mistrust of Department of Defense leadership occurs, the military's disciplinary construct is placed
at risk. 12 6 This judicial distrust included upholding federal judicial
intervention in determining the accuracy of claims of denial of conscientious
status while a court-martial was pending.1 27 It also
included divesting the military of jurisdiction over the offense of an
offieer distributing LSD off-base. 128 How the breaking of a promise
would translate from distrust amongst service-members to a judicial
reaction is difficult to predict, but it is clear that significant litigation
will follow any changes to the retirement system as the changes affect
current serving service-members.

B.

OTHER EFFECTS

Although not the primary focus of this Article, as a matter of national security, it is worthwhile to note that there is very little possibility that the government could lawfully tie the receipt of annuity
payments from a 401(k) to an authority to recall retired service-members in times of national crisis. Former military members are subject
to be recalled to active duty under a variety of circumstances. 129 In
Hennis v. Hemlick, 130 the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit determined that it would not interfere in the Army's
recall of a retiree to active duty for the purposes of court-martialing
122. 10 U.S.C. §§ 801-946 (2012).
123. 483 U.S. 435 (1987).
124. See, e.g., Eugene Fidell, 1'he Culture of' Change in Military Law, 126 MIL. L.
REv. 125 (1989); Edward Sherman, 1'he Civiliani.zation o{Military Law, 22 ME. L. REv.
3, 3-18 (1970).
125. 395 U.S. 258 (1969).
126. O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258, 262 (1969).
127. See Parisi v. Davidson, 405 U.S. 34, 37 (1972).
128. See Joshua E. Kastenberg, Cause and Elf'ect: The Origins and Impact of Justice
William 0. Douglas's Anti-Military Ideology From World War II to O'Callahan v.
Parker, 26 T.M. CooLEY. L. REv. 163, 182 (2009).
129. See, e.g., McCarty v. McCarty, 453 U.S. 210, 234 (1981), superseded by statute,
Uniformed Services Former Spouses Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 97-252, 96 Stat. 718
(1982), as recognized in Barker v. Kansas, 503 U.S. 594, 602 (1992).
130. 666 F.3d 270 (4th Cir. 2012).
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the retiree for murder. 131 It is true that the Fourth Circuit predicated
its decision on the principle that the military courts were firstly responsible for guarding the service-member's rights. 132 Nonetheless,
the federal courts will intervene when it is a clear matter that the
military administratively has violated a service-member's rights. 1 33
The required regimentation of service-members extends to such
personal matters as the weight and physical fitness of individuals, as
well as other aspects necessary to ensure that the individual servicemember may be ready to deploy into an operation. Because the 401(k)
contribution becomes the property of the service-member, there is little financial disincentive to stop a service-member from, for instance,
eating his or her way out of the military at the sixteen year point. 134
Likewise, a service-member's deliberate avoidance of complying with
other standards such as hygiene or grooming regulations could result
in a discharge with full accrual of 401(k) benefits. These are but two
examples of how the relationship between the 401(k) system and military discipline has not been considered.
Military retirements under the traditional twenty year program
are predicated on the former service-member's agreement to be subject to recall. 135 The imposition of a mandatory 401(k) program would
eliminate part of the potential trained national defense, for the simple
reason that the 401(k) will be the property of the military member.
Indeed, it is not difficult to foresee, given the past history of recalls,
that a number of "retired" service-members would refuse to return to
active duty. 136
As already stated, the Defense Business Board's ("DBB") proposal
of mandated contributions to a specific account is of questionable legality, and the DBB proposal's failure to grandfather in all serving
service-members would likewise and in all probability be unlawful. It
is not overly imaginative to urge that where an unlawful program is
forced on service-members, the discipline of service-members will
131. Hennis v. Hemlick, 666 F.3d 270, 272 (4th Cir. 2012).
132. Hennis, 666 F.3d at 278.
133. See, e.g., Kanai v. McHugh, 638 F.3d 251 (4th Cir. 2011) (denying a conscientious objector applicant); Hanna v. Sec'y ofthe Army, 513 F.3d 4 (1st Cir. 2008) (denying
a conscientious objector applicant).
134. See generally DEP'T OF THE ARMY, FM 21-20: PHYSICAL FITNESS TRAINING
(1998); Memorandum from the Dep't of the Air Force on Air Force Instruction 36-2905
(Jan. 3, 2013) (on file with author), available at http://static.e-publishing.af.mil/
productionll!af_al/publicationlafi36-2905/afi36-2905.pdf.
135. 10 U.S.C. § 688(a)-(c) (2012); see also United States v. Overton, 24 M.J. 309
(C.M.A. 1987); United States v. Hooper, 9 C.M.A. 637 (1958).
136. 10 U.S.C. § 802 (providing that retired members of a regular component of the
armed forces who are entitled to pay are subject to the UCMJ); see, e.g., Hooper, 9
C.M.A. at 640-45 (describing the extent of court-martial jurisdiction over retired officers
in receipt of retirement pay).
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likely erode. One need only look at the breakdown of the Abu Ghraib
prison guards to draw a worthwhile analogy. The investigation conducted by Major General Antonio Taguba concluded that numerous
incidents of misconduct and the failure to adhere to lesser regulations
contributed to the breakdown in discipline. 137 The DBB's proposal not
only dismisses the record and contributions of service-members with
corporatist spin, but also proposes a legally dubious so-called "budgetary reform" that would, if adopted, have an exponentially deleterious
effect on military discipline.
IV.

CONCLUSION

In 1973, noted military strategist Bernard Brodie remarked that
one of the military lessons that came from the conflict in Vietnam was
in contemporary conflicts to distance the military from the public
through the termination of conscription. 138 The "All Volunteer Force"
construct included an emphasis on military retirements and medical
care for long-serving service-members, in exchange for their voluntary
relinquishment of rights. The removal of a permanent governmental
obligation to career service-members, who defend the nation, is another step in creating such a distance, because it removes the public's
obligations to the service-member. If this were all that the current
retirement alteration schemes accomplished, it would be troubling
enough.
On August 19, 2011, Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta stated
that the military retirement system is secure in its present form for
current service-members, but these assurances are sound only to the
extent that Congress does not decide to adopt part or the entire Defense Business Board ("DBB") proposaP39 In May, 2012, the Center
for American Progress ("CAP") released a proposal to "reform" the military retirement system along the similar lines as the DBB. 140 Like
the DBB, the CAP did not consider the effect of a conversion from the
current retirement system on military discipline. This is why it re137. See ANToNIO M. TAGUBA, CoALITION FoRCES LAND CoMPONENT CoMMAND, AR
15-6: INVESTIGATION oF THE SOOTH MILITARY PoLICE BRIGADE 34-51 (2004), available at
http://www .gwu.edu/-nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB140/TR3.pdf.
138. See BERNARD BRODIE, WAR AND PoLITICS 171, 200, 360 (1973).
139. See, e.g., Ed O'Keefe, Panetta: Military Retirement Changes Shouldn't Affect
Current Troops, WASH. PosT (Oct. 13, 2012, 3:50PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/
blogs/federal-eye/post/panetta-military-retirement-changes-shouldnt-affect-currenttroops/2011/10/13/giQAgJY6hL_blog.html.
140. See LAwRENCE J. KoRB ET AL., CTR. FOR AM. PRoGREss, REFORMING MILITARY
CoMPENSATION: ADDRESSING RuNAWAY CosTs Is A PERSONAL IMPERATIVE (2012), available at http://www.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/issues/2012/05/pdf!military
_compensation. pdf. Korb is a military and national security affairs expert of considerable standing. However, his report does not consider the legal impediments to his proposed changes.
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mains crucial to restate that the DBB's and similar proposals only
considers economics and one sided views of equity, rather than national security, military
and civil-military relations, the
rights of service-members, legal problems, or the morality of their respective proposals. This alone is troubling. But, if put into effect now,
or in the future, there are significant implications. In a Washington
Post editorial, professor and military scholar Andrew Bacevich criticized the DEB's proposal as immoral and created out of malice, or ignorance, and not reflecting the profession of arms. 141 His arguments
were sound, but even he neglected to consider the disciplinary implications to the DEB's proposal.
'rhe degradation of military discipline is a national security matter. Creating a questionably unlawful retirement construct under the
fictional guise of "reform" will certainly affect military readiness and
discipline. The distrust of congressional leadership within the military is not simply a theoretical proposition. Failed congressional leadership on this issue would exacerbate the decline of both civil-military
relations and discipline. At a time when the nation's ability to influence nascent democratic movements and reassure allies in the Pacific
and Near East is under challenge, one might reasonably ask how a
decline of military morale
empower America's challengers. 'rhis
is
true when the loss morale would occur as a result of
a proposal which, if implemented,
be unconstitutional. This is
more significant
a broken
Finally, even if
:members were "grandfathered" into
traditional twenty year retirement, a decline of military discipline
the weakening of court-martial sentences will occur if the DEB's
were
twenty years forward. If Congress desires the nation to maintain e.
reliable first rate military, it must not treat
military as merely an
economic proposition where
bottom line governs in lieu of other
equally important aspects.

141. Andrew Bacevich, The Army Isn't Like Corporate America. It's Retirement
Shouldn't Be, Either, WASH. PosT, Aug. 21, 2011, at B3.

